The term Local-Self Government (LSG) evokes multiple images among various stakeholders. For some, the LSG is a tool of ‘Democratic Decentralization’ or for others it is ‘Third Tier of Government’ or mechanism of ‘Grass Root Level Democracy’. However, when it comes to actual practice of LSG in India, the reality is far away from the above images. The philosophy of LSG is inherent in the idea of ‘Self-government’, which implies that the institutions of LSG exist in their own right and not merely as a means for the externally determined end. The philosophy of LSG is concerned with explaining their fundamental objective or raison de’ etre in India.
The LSG takes two forms in India: Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in rural areas and municipalities in urban areas. However, this paper is confined to identify the fundamental objectives of PRIs in the existing arrangement and the same can be applied in case of urban local bodies. If we trace and review the facts about the objectives of these institutions available in the literature on their conception, reports of various committees, or the mission and vision of government, it reveals inherent contradictions in vision and actual practice. Rather, it enforces the view that the PRIs are not the agencies of self-government as they exist as a tool for facilitating implementation of externally determined development schemes under the rubric of rural development. Of course, they still retain their image of being ‘local’ and ‘elected’, but without the idea and practice of ‘self’.
The PRIs have faced their existential challenge since their very inception in independent India. When the first Draft of Indian Constitution was placed before the Constituent Assembly, there was no mention of PRIs in the draft. Dr Rajendra Prasad, the President of Constituent Assembly, drew attention of Dr Ambedkar to this omission through his letter on May 10, 1948. After much debate and opposition from Dr Ambedkar, Article 40 was inserted in the Constitution under DPSPs on the proposal of noted Gandhian K. Santhanam, submitted on November 25, 1948. This non-binding provision seeks to ‘endow them with such power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government’ (MOPR: 2018). While Gandhi considered Self-sustaining Panchayats as the core of ‘Gram Swarajya’, Dr Ambedkar abhorred village Panchayats as he argued that the Indian villages were nothing but ‘a sink of localism, a den of ignorance and communalism’ (Live Mint: 2015). This contradictory visualization of PRIs was carried forward in their future evolution and conception. In the Constitution, the entry no. 5 of the State List (7th Schedule) mentions LSG as ‘Local Government’, though ironically, its final purpose is declared to be ‘self-government’.
In 1950s, image of LSGs was projected as ‘Panchayati Raj’, following the recommendations of Balwant Rai Mehta Committee Report, 1957. Interestingly, this Committee was appointed to review the progress of Community Development Programme (1952) and the National Extension Service Scheme (1953), (Not for strengthening PRIs) and accordingly it viewed the PRIs a tool for enlisting popular support in the implementation of rural development schemes. It even suggested that the Collector should be the Chairman of Zila Parishad, which is placed at the three tier PRIs. This initial perception of PRIs as a tool still continues to persist among those who decide the fate of PRIs. Though, Ashok Mehta Committee (1978) recommended, inter alia, placing all district level development functions under the Zila Parishad, its recommendations were not accepted by the government for political reasons.
The GVK Rao Committee on PRIs (1985) suggested that the District Development Commissioner (DDC) should be made the Chief Executive of the Zilla Parishad in those states where the Panchayati Raj institutions hold the responsibility for planning and implementation of various development programmes. But the committee was clueless as in which part of the country PRIs exercise the responsibility for the planning and implementation of development programmes. However, LM Singhvi Committee for the Concept paper on PRIs (1986) tried to retrieve the idea of self-government as it noted, ‘The Panchayati Raj Institutions have to be viewed as institutions of self-government which would naturally facilitate the participation of the people in the process of planning and development flowing from and as part of the concept of self-government. Development planning should be democratic planning’. This vision of PRIs was never put into practice. The Thungon Committee on PRIs (1988) reversed the idea of self-government as it unduly relied on district administration for development activities (Shodhganga: 2018).
The 73rd Constitution Amendment, 1992 is viewed as a milestone in the history of empowerment of PRIs in India, but it also falls short of visualizing them as institutions of self-governance. It leaves PRIs on the sweet will of states to endow them powers of making and implementing the plans of economic development and social justice (Article 243 G) and makes the plans prepared by the District Planning Committee subject to the approval of state government (Article 243 ZD).
The perception of PRIs as a tool of development has resulted in two negative outcomes: First, it makes PRIs as the culprit for the failures of development plans, as they are projected as agencies for their implementation. But, as we know, the success of development process is contingent on many factors beyond the control of PRIs. Second, this perception hampers the growth of element of ‘collective agency’ in PRIs. ‘Agency’ is the ability to make one’s own choices and act upon them. Collective agency occurs when people act together with purpose, power and rationality (Hewson: 2010).
The Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MOPR), Government of India has identifies certain factors, which hamper the growth of local self-government in India. These factors are: Lack of adequate devolution, Excessive control by bureaucracy: Tied nature of funds, Reluctance to use fiscal powers, and Non-harmonization between State Acts and central legislations. However, its focus seems to be on strengthening functional abilities of PRIs rather than altering the perception about the PRIs as tools of government sponsored schemes. The Vision and Mission of MOPR are also at odds with each other. How its Vision of attaining decentralized and participatory local self-government can be harmonized with its Mission of empowering and enabling PRIs to ensure inclusive development with social justice, and efficient delivery of services (MOPR: 2018) .
The foregoing discussion reveals that we have consistently perpetuated and practiced the idea of local self-government as tool of development, undermined their ‘collective agency’ and held contradictory position on its nature and goals. These developments have blurred the philosophy of LSG, existing for own value and purpose as institution of democratic decentralization.
A noted scholar finds it embarrassing to use the term ‘local self-government’ in India and instead preferred to call it ‘local government’ only (Maheshwari : 2008). We need to transit from devolution of 3Fs to the division of powers between the states and LSGs.
